
AN
APPEAL
TO THE
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND,
&c. &c.

AN
APPEAL



AN
APPEAL
TO THE
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND,
OCCASIONED BY
THE LATE DECLARATION
OF THE
FRENCH DIRECTORY.

France
Director

Awake! Arise! or be for ever fallen!

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. DEBETT, opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly.

1798. 4

APPEAL

TO THE

PEOPLE OF ENGLAND

OCCASIONED BY

THE FATH DECREE

OF THE

FRENCH DIRECTORY



Acquired by the British Museum

LONDON

Printed for J. D. B. & Co. at the British Museum Press

44
3
423 29

AN
APPEAL
TO THE
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND,
&c. &c.

ALTHOUGH the weakness and wildness of that virulent declamation lately published by the French Directory in opposition to the English Manifesto, must be evident to unprejudiced eyes, yet as there still exists a band of Frenchified Englishmen, ready to seize every opportunity to revile their own country, it will not be time mispent to counteract their seducing manœuvres, by examining the principal misrepresentations in a paper dictated by the most deadly enmity. Some observations may be useful on the many artifices that have been used to mislead the understandings of the People of England, and on the real grounds of those unusual efforts that must now be expected from them.

The Proclamation of the Executive Directory begins by representing England as the only power that has retarded the peace of Europe, "and whilst it dispatched negotiators with ostentation, repelled all the overtures which alone could tend to pacification." Suppose the accusation were admitted, suppose we had persuaded the various Cabinets of Europe not to conclude peace upon the ignominious terms proposed by France, such endeavours may be crimes in the eyes of Frenchmen, but it does not follow that they ought to be criminal in the eyes of Englishmen, nay, even in the eyes of Europeans in general. Let the real aim of France be considered, as unmasked by some of its own writers. It is not to ameliorate the condition of the human race, not to introduce universal liberty and universal peace, as was fondly believed by some romantic philosophers, sonneteers, and novel-writers.—No; it is to introduce gradually a dominion as extensive and despotic as that of the Roman empire, and whose ambitious pretensions are sufficiently intimated by the pompous title officially given in this performance to the French, of the *Great Nation*, "*La Grande Nation*," as if all the rest of mankind were pigmies born to serve a superior race of beings. For this purpose they make and un-

make Monarchies or Republics as they think best, dazzle tradesmen and peasants with the lure of democracy, suffer them to play with the toys of municipalities and elections, till the moment comes when the mask is taken off, and the *Great Nation* exclaims, it does not become you to set up for an independent Republic ; you must be absorbed in our immense dominion, or be given to a Prince whom but a month ago we publicly called a despot and a tyrant. In the mean while, some of these pretended tyrants are taken under the *Great Nation's* immediate protection ; and if they consent to shed the blood of their subjects in such fields of battle as the French direct, the French Generals shall discountenance those subjects who would follow the French example, and adopt the Creed of the Unalienable Rights of Man.

What is the real source of these contradictions ? One of their journals, called *Tablettes Historiques*, betrays their secret in a paragraph on the Treaty of Udina, which is yet one of the most moderate that has appeared on the subject *. “ I shall observe, that the happiness of
“ a nation, and especially of a Republic, has

* See Peltier's *Tableau de Paris*, No. 145, page 131.

“ not a vast extent of territory for its basis ;
 “ it is sufficient to be strong enough to re-
 “ sist the attacks of foreigners, *and even rule*
 “ *them by its influence* * ; to domineer, to rule
 by influence, such has been the invariable
 system of the French Cabinet, whether regal
 or directorial. Kings, Senators, Representa-
 tives, may bear what titles they please, they
 must be content to be puppets danced on
 the wires of a French Ambassador’s crooked
 artifices, even as the Romans antiently go-
 verned their pretended allies through the
 medium of Proconsuls. This Government
 would end in modern as in antient days, by the
 final annexation of the tributary state to the do-
 minions of the *Great Nation*, and a few scrupu-
 lous writers might question in vain the propriety
 of such conduct, after they had sanctioned the
 means which infallibly lead to such an end.

So odious have ever appeared these views of
 universal empire by means of universal influ-
 ence, that the French exert all their faculties to
 prove that we are guilty of those crimes more
 justly imputed to themselves. We are told by

* Les dominer par son influence, are the original French
 words.

the Directory, that the English Government is the most corrupted and the most corrupting of all the Governments in Europe. It is an old and a trite remark, that men readily believe those vices to exist in others which they feel within their own breasts: and hence we may account for the incessant declamations which French Courtiers and French Republicans have equally uttered against British corruption.

If the ignominious corruption of Members of Parliament, by actual sums of money, did exist, in any considerable degree, in Sir Robert Walpole's time, (which is yet a questionable point,) it has been diminishing ever since; and there is no reason to believe that it exists at present.—As to foreign corruption, if the secret-service books of each country were laid open, the French would have most reason to blush on the comparison. Could it be revealed how many of their Republican victories have been owing to the base treachery of officers hired to betray their country*, and how often the subsidies torn from impoverished Frenchmen have been la-

* Buonaparte's victories lie particularly open to that suspicion; and an expression in one of his letters that he knew of the Austrian designs from many quarters, has been urged as a confirmation.

vished on profligate courtiers to persuade their masters to a shameful desertion of their allies, it would not long remain doubtful who was “ the most corrupting nation in Europe.”

America and India are next held out as instances of the desolating influence of our corruption. As to India, that article will deserve a separate consideration :—suffice it at present to observe, that it is to be placed amongst those causes which most urgently demand our strenuous efforts to be exerted in the present warfare. But it is curious to observe how much the French are offended with those American Statesmen who do not wish that the quarrel between two countries allied in blood should be eternal. When Washington in his youth attacked, in the defence of his country, the French Commandant Jumonville, the French, without ceremony, called him an assassin ; and in his old age, I suppose they esteem him a base pensioner of England, because he did not chuse to be turned out of his seat by Citizen Genet’s intrigues.

The same or a worse compliment is probably bestowed upon Adams, who wrote an excellent book on Republican Government, and whose

principles on the necessity of two legislative Councils, the French themselves have reluctantly been obliged to admit. The real fact is very different. The principal Americans have at last discovered, that our goods are more useful to the Americans than French merchandise, whilst their commodities meet with readier payment in England than in France; and that, supposing each nation to have alternately wronged them, they meet with fair words and promises of redress in England, whilst they are answered with threats and insolence in France: and from this attention to their own interest the French conclude they must be bribed! I wonder what occult science they suppose Mr. Pitt to possess, what *Aladin's Lamp* has poured down at his feet, all the millions which they have year after year supposed him to spend in bribery, whilst the Argus' eyes of a jealous Opposition has never discovered them amongst the public accounts. The whole secret-service money voted for these last seven years, would not suffice for one-tenth of the business allotted to it by French politicians, unless perfidy and sedition are sunk to an astonishing low price indeed!

Another strange reproach is attempted, and we are called "the first ravagers of the island

“ of St. Domingo ;” whereas it is notorious to all the world, that the conflicts of opposing factions had reduced that unhappy island to a heap of ashes, moistened with human blood, as early as the year 1791 ; and it was not till the end of 1793, that English troops landed at St. Nicholas’ Mole to save a few remaining miserable planters and their families from brutality and murder.—The opposite writings of Mr. Bryan Edwards and the Colonel Venault de Charmilly have brought out a very important truth—that the English Government resisted for two years the invitations of the discontented planters. Adverse to each other in every thing else, Edwards and Charmilly agree in this one point. I shall give the express words of the latter, only premising, that the reasons he assigns to the British Ministry may be conjectural ; but of the fact itself, he is an undeniable witness, because his avowal precludes him from any hopes of mercy in France.

Letter of Charmilly to Edwards, page 4, (of the French edition)—“ I believe you mean to
 “ quote the epocha of 1791. I had then the
 “ honour to see the Minister of the King of
 “ England. From that moment, I proposed
 “ to the English Government to save its own
 “ colonies by saving St. Domingo. The Re-

“volutionary spirit which had overset all the
 “ French heads, afforded just and prudent rea-
 “ sons to the British Ministry to refuse an offer
 “ made too late, and become, by the conflagra-
 “ tion of the plantations, too unimportant to
 “ venture the chances of a war with France.”

We are next, with somewhat more plausibility, accused of taking without a blow, the colonies of Holland, which was then our ally. It was evident to reason, that when Holland was completely in the hands of the French, it would necessarily become our enemy : for if a neutrality would have satisfied the French, the unhappy Stadtholder offered it, and was actually treating for a separate peace when expelled by French arms, assisted by a faction of his own revengeful countrymen. Had their rich merchants been really so earnest for the safety of their East-Indian possessions, they ought to have said—let a Stadtholder govern ; let us subscribe our money to defend him, rather than the trade of our country should be ruined.

The French, when they first entered Holland, might have deceived the Dutch as they did the Belgians, and incorporated Holland with their own Republic ; in which case it was certainly

lawful to take the possessions of our enemy. But although a nominal independence is *for the present* allowed the Batavian Republic, the league offensive and defensive with France, which she was compelled to sign in May 1795, fully justified the seizure of all her foreign possessions. None of the Dutch colonies yielded without a blow (unless, perhaps, Malacca, which we have no thoughts of retaining). All the fortified towns in Ceylon or Malabar stood a siege; and if their defence was not very obstinate, there is no need to have recourse to treachery for an explanation, as the insufficiency of the modern Dutch, in every part of the art of war, (except maritime war), is sufficiently notorious.

Here I cannot but remark a strange misrepresentation in the mock letter published in the *Redacteur* under the name of Lord Malmesbury, stating that the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, which we asked to retain, were the only possessions we had taken from Holland, and therefore implying that we refused to make her any restoration. What is still more extraordinary, Peltier in his *Tableau de Paris*, meaning to correct the *Redacteur*, could only recollect Demerary in America as a colony we were willing to return. The writers of modern books and

journals must be very ignorant in history, to forget Malacca and the Spice Islands, for whose possession so much blood was formerly shed, and so many crimes * have been committed.

But if these conquests are to be called by no other name than robberies, let France restore all that it has taken by any other means than decisive battles ; let it restore Avignon to the Pope, since it was acquired by the encouragement given by French clubs to a hord of banditti ; let it restore Nice and Savoy, taken by a sudden attack upon their unprepared Monarch ; and above all, let it restore the possessions of the Neutral Republic of Venice, or let it own that one robbery may be as good a title as another.

We never robbed France of any possessions whilst we remained in an avowed state of neutrality ; nor did we excite insurrection by bribery, though a hundred French declaimers may

* Sometimes in conversation, and also in books, Ceylon appears to be confounded with the Spice Islands, (Ternate, Tidor, Banda, Amboyna,) though the latter are at an immense distance from the former. The cause of such frequent geographical and historical mistakes appears to be, that young people are too much habituated to frivolous reading to like plain facts. But this question would demand an essay by itself.

be hired to assert our guilt. The instances given in the paper on which I comment, of Toulon and of Dunkirk, of Quiberon and of La Vendée, were all suitable to the laws of open war. Morality, more rigorous than law, might have grieved if we had found Toulon in a state of peace and happiness and excited it to rebel. But we found it engaged in a dreadful civil war, and its inhabitants threw themselves into our hands, merely to save their lives from the tyranny of Roberspierre. A similar remark may be applied to the Vendée, whose primary cause of revolt was independent of English machinations : it originated from that most cutting of all provocations,—the intolerance of Atheists !

It was not surprizing that Englishmen should wish to possess Dunkirk. It was once the rightful property of England, both by conquest and by compact ; it was basely sold by a prodigal King ; its harbour had ever been the terror of our merchants, and the receptacle of those fleets intended sometimes to restore a despot, sometimes to introduce anarchy into this happy island. Our allies (as I have heard) censure us heavily for that ill-concerted expedition, and say that it gave the first unfortunate turn to the war ; but France has no other right to place it amongst

our crimes, than we have to censure her pertinacious resolution to get possession of Flanders. The expedition to Quiberon may be disliked not only by the friends of France, but by many true friends to England, who cannot persuade themselves to esteem the emigrants. Yet it may be replied that it was necessary, once for all, to make an experiment whether (as the emigrants believed) the people of France would indeed rise in their favour, if once they saw them landed unconnected with foreign troops, and secure that no dismemberment of France was intended. The experiment failed, and no intention has since been shewn to repeat it. The army of the Prince of Condé, which England paid as a body of auxiliary troops, was dismissed from English service at the very time of those negotiations which the Directory affects to represent as insincere; but they take great care not to recall a circumstance which affords a good presumptive proof of our sincerity.

Our enemies now bring forward the heaviest of all their accusations, that which is indeed the groundwork of all their charges—we have dared to be rich whilst the rest of Europe is poor. They cunningly avail themselves of the King's Speech to prove that our Government must wish

the continuance of the war, because the King assures his Parliament that our revenues, our industry and our commerce, are increased. It may be true, and yet neither our Government, nor our people, have reason to be lovers of war; for had Europe continued to enjoy the blessings of peace, or had the war been of such a nature that we could have avoided it without sacrificing our dearest interests, it is impossible to say to how much greater a degree our commerce and our wealth would have augmented. We suffer, Alas! we suffer but too severely from this dreadful war! every private man feels those sufferings in the burden of taxes, and the still greater burden of anxiety; and without considering Ministers as pure and perfect patriots, it is obvious that self-interest alone may suffice to harass their days and nights with care and apprehension.

No doubt England has suffered in a less degree than the rest of Europe; but this advantage does not arise from the Machiavelian arts of our rulers, but from the natural consequences of our insular situation. I believe there never was an instance in history of so large an island under one Government, so full of inhabitants inured to naval hardships, and so admirably

well situated for carrying on trade in so many different seas. Such a peculiar situation must give a peculiar cast to the manners and political views of the nation that possessed it, but cannot justly be imputed as a crime. If we have ever abused our advantages by too lofty a spirit, it has never equalled the tyranny which France has exerted in her days of prosperity,—and which she exerts at present in the fullest extent, although in the next paragraph her Directory assumes the seducing disguise of meekness. It pretends that France never oppresses secondary states and weak powers, she never plunders her allies, and yet, almost in the same breath, the force of truth extorts a confession that none of her despotic Monarchs ever made so openly.

“ The French Republic asserts the limits
 “ given it by Nature, and repairs in that re-
 “ spect the faults of the Monarchy.”

What a secret is here disclosed, and how plainly is demonstrated the fallacy of all those philosophical declamations on peace which so often dazzled inexperienced readers! It used to be a favourite tenet that the guilt of the French Monarchs chiefly consisted in shedding the blood, and exhausting the wealth of their

subjects on schemes of foreign conquest; and the French pretended to idolize Fenelon, because he had, under poetical allegories, exposed the wickedness and danger of such a system. But now the scene is changed, and we are told from official authority, that it was a great fault in those Monarchs not to have sufficiently extended the limits of France. Thus all the despotism of Richelieu, the corruption and artifice of Mazarin, the pride and ambition of Louis the Fourteenth, are justified by one stroke of the pen. Thus have the partisans of the Revolution been deprived of their strongest arguments, since the taxes, the grievances, the oppressions under which France laboured, were chiefly occasioned by the unremitting efforts of three successive Monarchs to extend their empire to the Rhine and the Northern Ocean. Little could the disciples of Fenelon have expected that, after all, the memory of those Kings should be vilified for having ever listened to the cries of distress, and consented to peace before they had fulfilled this indispensable duty.

What power (except the power of the sword) has constituted the French interpreters of the laws of Nature?—One of their Monarchs (I think it was Henry IV.) used to say, “ I wish

“ the King of Spain would shew me that article in the last will and testament of Adam, which has given the Spaniards an exclusive right to America.” These words may be retorted on the present rulers of France, and need no other application.—But how are we sure that this irrevocable law of Nature confines its operations within the limits of the Rhine? Whoever compares on a map the relative situation of France, Holland, and Germany, may observe that the mouth of the Zuyderzee, where the sea-coast begins to take an Eastern direction, looks more like a natural boundary than the mouth of the Rhine. Batavia was certainly included within the limits of antient Gaul; the French were always pleased with allusions to those limits; and Citizen Monge (for instance) exulted in his last speech, that now the whole of antient Gaul was free.—I leave this point to the serious consideration of such *Batavians* as are neither Prussians, English, or Frenchmen, but Dutchmen of the old independent stamp. Even supposing these limits of antient Gaul to be consonant to the will and laws of nature, by what law do the French seize upon the Venetian islands adjoining to Greece? Their motives are very obvious—partly to bridle the Emperor in his new acqui-

sition of Venice, but chiefly to injure as much as possible our Levant trade. But from similar motives we are justified in retaining some of our numerous acquisitions for the protection of our trade. If Nature and Justice condemn this conduct in us, let the French set us the example of observing the limits of Nature, and give these islands which border upon Italy to their new-erected Italian Republic.

The rest of the official Manifesto of the Directory is taken up with praising their moderation to weak States, in the face of such examples as Venice and Genoa, and with admiring the unity that exists in France since the fourth of last September. It would be easy to produce *such* a unity in England, if our Ministers—aye, or our King himself, dared but so much as think of surrounding the two Houses of Parliament with troops, chusing out the leading Members of Opposition, and sending them off to Botany-Bay, without the shadow of a trial, locked up like so many Bajazets in an iron cage. An attempt of much inferior enormity, cost the unhappy Charles the First his crown and his life! Yet Englishmen, it seems, are slaves, and stand in need of being regenerated by the laws of a French Directory. It is the ultimate end of this

famous publication to invite Frenchmen to accomplish this glorious purpose by means of an invasion of England ; and the same may be said of a letter from the Minister of Marine, which appeared a few days sooner. It is written with the same virulent spirit, but requires no particular observations, except in one passage, where it complains of the coalition formed against France when it was solely occupied in its own regeneration, and had decreed that it would not interfere in the government of independant States. This is one of those confused mixtures of a little truth and a great deal of falsehood by which the advocates for France have always endeavoured to puzzle the inattentive. No such words as he quotes were inserted in the first Constitution : it contained, indeed, a renunciation of conquests, which the constituent Assembly evaded by the usurpation of Avignon, and thus warned all the powers of Europe of the greater usurpations France would probably attempt as soon as she had recovered her strength. The public declarations of the Convention in November and December 1792, were undeniably hostile to every independant State ; and it was not till after the temporary expulsion of the French from Holland and Flanders, that the mortified Jacobins inserted these words in the preamble of

sition of Venice, but chiefly to injure as much as possible our Levant trade. But from similar motives we are justified in retaining some of our numerous acquisitions for the protection of our trade. If Nature and Justice condemn this conduct in us, let the French set us the example of observing the limits of Nature, and give these islands which border upon Italy to their new-erected Italian Republic.

The rest of the official Manifesto of the Directory is taken up with praising their moderation to weak States, in the face of such examples as Venice and Genoa, and with admiring the unity that exists in France since the fourth of last September. It would be easy to produce *such* a unity in England, if our Ministers—aye, or our King himself, dared but so much as think of surrounding the two Houses of Parliament with troops, chusing out the leading Members of Opposition, and sending them off to Botany-Bay, without the shadow of a trial, locked up like so many Bajazets in an iron cage. An attempt of much inferior enormity, cost the unhappy Charles the First his crown and his life! Yet Englishmen, it seems, are slaves, and stand in need of being regenerated by the laws of a French Directory. It is the ultimate end of this

famous publication to invite Frenchmen to accomplish this glorious purpose by means of an invasion of England; and the same may be said of a letter from the Minister of Marine, which appeared a few days sooner. It is written with the same virulent spirit, but requires no particular observations, except in one passage, where it complains of the coalition formed against France when it was solely occupied in its own regeneration, and had decreed that it would not interfere in the government of independant States. This is one of those confused mixtures of a little truth and a great deal of falsehood by which the advocates for France have always endeavoured to puzzle the inattentive. No such words as he quotes were inserted in the first Constitution: it contained, indeed, a renunciation of conquests, which the constituent Assembly evaded by the usurpation of Avignon, and thus warned all the powers of Europe of the greater usurpations France would probably attempt as soon as she had recovered her strength. The public declarations of the Convention in November and December 1792, were undeniably hostile to every independant State; and it was not till after the temporary expulsion of the French from Holland and Flanders, that the mortified Jacobins inserted these words in the preamble of

that Constitution of 1793, which never was put in practice. That promise has never yet been executed, as so many recent examples demonstrate. But it is wearisome to be constrained to such frequent repetitions, by the repetition of the “ Lie so oft o’erthrown :” Let us proceed to that remarkable paper inserted in the *Redacteur*, an official journal much more truly official than our ministerial papers, especially since the fourth of September, all newspapers being now submitted to the previous inspection of the Directory. This publication has another ultimate end to persuade all the powers of Europe to stand by quietly and see us ruined, because we tyrannize over the four quarters of the world. By what means ? Why ! by our numerous fleets and extensive trade.—Poor John Bull ! what a terrible accusation is here brought against thee !—* “ There “ is no concealing the disgrace, Sir ! He trades “ to all parts of the world !” The accusations are variously expressed, but tend all to prove this single crime.

* See the *Conscious Lovers*, Act V. Scene I. for the speech of Cimberton to his uncle Sir Geoffrey. It is whimsical enough that words invented by the comic poet to expose the absurd pride of gentry, should be so applicable to the sentiments of the French who destroyed gentry to favour the commercial profession.

Whether we send our manufactures to Prussia, Denmark, and Russia; whether we cultivate the barren wilds of New Holland, or endeavour to raise Canada into a populous and flourishing state, still the French are positive that some wicked design is hatching to the destruction of human kind. We send (forsooth!) agents into France to sell the lands of Savages to Frenchmen, and then set on the Savages to murder them!—If any Frenchmen have been so deceived, let them complain to their friends (perhaps I might say their *quondam* friends) the Americans, who have four times as much land to sell as the Canadians, and whose back-settlements have been frequently annoyed by Indians, whilst Canada has remained in peace. But we sell brandy and scalping-knives to the Savages. The more the pity! but Indians will trade with us on no other terms, and the Americans were ready to go to war with us for the posts on the Lakes, because they had not their due share in this wicked traffic. I must advise the French journalist to consult Charlevoix's History of New-France (if it has not been doomed to the flames as the work of a fanatic Monk). He will there find both the French and the Dutch strongly censured for having accustomed the Savages to that destructive liquor brandy, and

he will learn another truth not commonly known. The force of regal and ecclesiastical authority, was exerted in vain against the universal determination of the people of Canada to persevere in that gainful but pernicious trade; and Louis the Fourteenth himself was obliged patiently to see his laws evaded. This hint is addressed to those who impute all wrong and wickedness to Kings and Priests—perhaps also to those who think, that if the Parliament of England did but pass a law, the slave trade would *ipso facto* be instantly abolished.

But the attempt that we have made to civilise some Africans is treated as hypocritical philanthropy; and we are told that our settlement at Sierra Leona, was made with an intention of seizing the Canaries and the Cape de Verd Islands. Some people may smile at hearing that Mr. Clarkson and Granville Sharp's zeal for settling a democratic colony in Africa, should be so ill rewarded by the sons of democracy. But when we see our country accused of sending an embassy to China with a view of excluding all other nations from that trade, it is difficult to keep within those bounds of civility which authors ought to observe in a national controversy. To avoid indiscreet expressions, I

shall simply refer all readers, English or foreign, to the printed account of the embassy, especially that chapter which mentions our offer to the Dutch to represent their grievances as well as our own ; and then leave it to the readers to consider, whether the honour and veracity of Lord M——y and Sir G. St——n are not as unfulfilled as those of a party-writer in the pay of the French Directory. But these papers, on which I have already commented, with many others of the like stamp, call for the most serious reflections, of both foreigners and Englishmen, at the present critical juncture.

If foreign Princes suffer themselves to be dazzled with declamatory harangues on the liberty of the seas and the liberty of commerce, I would desire them to recollect the indiscriminate destruction of every King and every Republic of the antient world, after they had suffered Rome to oppress, and at last to destroy, her great rival Carthage. There is no pedantry in this invitation ; it will soon, perhaps, grow pedantic for a German Minister to talk of the Golden Bull, or the Treaty of Westphalia, since the rapid current of time is sweeping into oblivion the institutions of the last thousand years, and is bringing up again to daylight the institutions of

the antient Republican ages. A Statesman should now direct his attention towards those studies which demonstrate that truth so fatally denied at the beginning of these troubles—the restless spirit of democracy, and its love of foreign wars. Let Statesmen open the page of antient history, and they will see that Carthage had drawn on itself the envy of other States, by a commercial spirit somewhat too monopolizing; but when this envy induced them tamely to indure its destruction, not one of these envious States was afterwards able to oppose more than a few years resistance to the unbalanced power of Rome. If before the third and final Carthaginian war, the half-civilized but valiant Spaniards, the Achaïan confederacy, the Kings of Syria and Egypt had joined in alliance to defend Carthage against the unceasing encroachments of Rome, Egypt, Syria, Greece, and Spain, might (if they pleased) have improved their own Governments, but would not have been reformed and plundered by oppressive Proconsuls. They never had the spirit or the sincerity to stand united to each other; they fought singly, and therefore they fell singly and unpitied. The situation of modern Europe so strongly resembles that of antient Europe at so remote a period, the same words almost will

serve to describe it. Let not Foreign Statesmen trust the fallacious hopes that France will be contented with the limits assigned to it by nature. No country had its limits so strongly marked by nature as Italy; and yet as soon as the Romans held it in uncontrouled subjection, their restless ambition and avarice led them on to Greece, to Africa, to the utmost limits of the known and civilized world.

When the English are accused before the tribunal of Europe merely for their wealth and their commerce, it becomes our Judges to recollect that English wealth (derived from commerce) has been uniformly employed for these last hundred years in protecting the weaker powers of Europe from the ambition of the French. Let them recollect also, that even now we were ready to give up our conquests, could we have restored the balance of power in Europe. Nay, even at the present moment, it is probable that yet more disgraceful conditions of peace would be offered to Germany and Austria, if the apprehension of the naval power of England did not incline the French to rid themselves of other enemies.

Should the different States that compose the Germanic body be so stupified by terror or in-

trigue as to suffer the French to march to Hamburgh, should they allow the continental ports to be shut against England to force it into a peace calculated to destroy our commercial greatness, they will have signed their own death-warrant. Nor is there a King or a Senate in Christendom, who must not expect to be treated as the Romans treated the contemptible descendants of the Ptolemies : a circle will be drawn round them, and the decree pronounced, “ Stir not from thence till you have obeyed the decrees of the Great Republic.”

From these considerations I must now turn to the English nation, and desire them to observe, that the very invectives of the French furnish an apology for that system of continental alliances, subsidies, and wars, so often reprobated by very plausible writers, who do not seem to have enough considered the dreadful effects of envy upon the human mind.

A neutral nation, rich, secure from invasion, and powerful at sea, would be liable to abuse that happy situation by insolence. But even if it could avoid that alluring fault, the very circumstance of being rich and peaceable, whilst others were poor and desolated by war, would

be enough to tempt all the impoverished nations into a league to reduce it to their own level. I greatly fear that many a German, whilst he reads the *Redacteur*, feels himself urged by the same spirit that animated the *Tiers-Etat* against the Nobles and Clergy. He considers the English as a *privileged cast*, exempt from the general misfortunes of war, and not liable to see their corn carried off, their houses burnt, and their wives and daughters exposed to a licentious soldiery. Why must we suffer all this, (he cries,) whilst these islanders remain undisturbed—and therefore he secretly wishes that Buonaparte may break through our *wooden walls*, and plant the standard of desolation on the Tower of London, the Bank, and the India-House.

It is painful to entertain such sentiments of human nature; but the transactions that we now see passing in the world, appear to confirm these opinions, and cast a gloomy shade over the minds of all thinking persons. Yet human nature is not so far depraved, as to admit men to avow, even to themselves, such detestable feelings: and from hence it arises that all crimes imputed to the rich and powerful meet with such ready belief, because malevolence and envy

seek a salvo for themselves under the disguise of justice. Hence all the offences that the English have ever committed in any part of the world, (especially in the East-Indies,) are repeated with monstrous aggravations; and old calumnies, often refuted, are still copied on from one book into another, till at length they attain the credit of undeniable truths. The Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Dutch, have all been thus treated in their days of commercial greatness; and yet the remembrance of their own indignation will not hinder them from joining in the cry against their successors in the *uncertain favour of the Sea-Nymphs**.

I have for these reasons considered the subsidies we have repeatedly given to foreigners as a tax that we paid to soften the rancour of continental jealousy; that jealousy which, at the time of the league of Cambray, precipitated Venice from her height of power (Venice which gloried like Britain that the sea was her defence,) and gradually prepared the way to her ignominious dissolution. We are better defended than Venice; yet who will dare to assert that we could for ever resist the efforts of a whole Continent united under one head?

* See the two last books of the *Lusiad*.

For my own part, I have been long convinced that we neither deceived ourselves, nor deceived the powers on the Continent by the leagues we have so often formed for the preservation of Flanders and Holland. But that point is discussed in a work called an Historical Essay on the Ambition and Conquests of France, and the opinions of many of the wisest and most disinterested Englishmen collected into one view.

It has been said in the House of Commons, that if Mr. Pitt insisted, during the first negotiation of Lord Malmesbury, on the restitution of Flanders in preference to retaining our own conquests, he sacrificed our interests to those of the Emperor; but I think, on the contrary, that both those interests were consulted alike. The inspection of a map of Europe will shew to unprejudiced eyes, that the danger of invasion from the Scheld and the Texel, is a greater evil than can be compensated by any wealth derived from foreign possessions. Perhaps I rather blame Mr. Pitt for not having offered to restore enough of the Dutch possessions; but probably he would have done so, had the negotiation been suffered to proceed. For it should be considered, that if an independant power, and a power of as much account as Austria, could have been again

interposed between Holland and France, the Dutch might have had leisure to emancipate themselves from their present subjection. I do not speak of their return to the Stadtholderian Government ; but it is possible that the Democratic Magistrates might have observed that it was not for the true interest of Holland to be engaged by the French in a state of perpetual enmity with England. In their present situation they have no alternative left them ; the French are within their very doors ; and upon the least suspicion that they intended a neutrality, might turn out their Batavian Convention, and, perhaps, annex them irrevocably to France.

Another objection has been started, that the enemy could not believe us sincere, because we had changed our ground of negotiation. But the objects of treaties must change with the changeable course of events. When Lord Malmesbury first went to Paris, there were hopes that Russia would have joined in the general cause ; there were hopes that Mantua might have been relieved by the military talents of the Arch-duke Charles, and those events might have given such a new turn to the war, as might have induced the French to depart from their pretensions. When these hopes failed, it be-

came necessary to alter our scheme of negotiation. Nothing can restore the security we have lost by the conquests of France on the Continent; but if we would not totally desert the duty of self-preservation, we can do no less than ask, as a poor equivalent, some security for our possessions either in the West or the East-Indies.

A Member is said to have asked lately in the House of Commons, how it happened that the allies were kept together during the wars of King William and of Queen Anne more firmly than in the present times; and whether the change arose from any increasing insolence on our part. He might be furnished, perhaps, with a better solution by reflecting, that in those wars we did not exert our whole strength to conquer the colonies of France, and therefore there was not the same occasion given to arouse the Dæmon of commercial jealousy. Hence it proceeded that the offer of our West-Indian conquests to redeem the Emperor's territories was now become a measure almost indispensable to alleviate that jealousy. Though I am not inclined to think Ministers impeachable, yet there is no reflecting without compassion on the contradictory accusations to which they stand exposed.

* The Ministers of William and of Anne were severely censured by the Tories for exerting their chief efforts on the Continent, and not sufficiently attending to the destruction of our enemy's naval strength, and the reduction of his colonies, whilst, perhaps, they kept their allies from desertion by that very conduct. During the American war it was the general cry that England was not a match for France, because she had no allies on the Continent. We began this present war with many allies, and the Opposition immediately reprobated all our treaties of alliance. Whilst the Austrians were successful, it was usual to hear it said in company, Of what use to England is the taking of Valenciennes?—It would not, perhaps, have been difficult to prove, that if Austria, at the conclusion of the war, could have been left in possession of Valenciennes, Lille, and Dunkirk, the additional security that we should have acquired might have justified a reduction in our military and naval establishments, and consequently have occasioned a reduction of taxes. But such a chain of arguments is not likely to be attended to in mixed company. What followed upon this?

* See, amongst other instances, Lord Rochester's Dedication of Lord Clarendon's History to Queen Anne.

We did attempt conquests more immediately useful to our trade, and they were equally reprobated. Our allies were taught to believe that we intended to monopolize the whole traffic of sugar *; and the particular unfortunate circumstance of unhealthy seasons has since been employed to render those West-Indian islands unpopular, whose acquisition was once considered as so great a benefit. Lastly, after we were taught to hate the idea of Continental alliances, we have been again left to ourselves; and the Opposition are now predicting our ruin, because we stand unaided and alone. Many persons who were terrified at the designs of the French in 1792, have now forgot their terrors, and are vociferating, What business had we in the present war? Why could not we have remained neuter?

It is certain that our situation is much changed for the worse since the commencement (in April 1792) of the war between Austria and France; and nothing is more short, easy, and intelligible, than to lay the whole blame on our

* See Playfair's History of Jacobinism, where the neglect that the Austrians shewed to the English in the campaign of 1794, is partly attributed to that circumstance.

rulers. But suppose there should exist a nation full of active and busy spirits, indifferent to their own misery, so they can acquire fame, and reduce other nations to poverty and disgrace, is it not obvious that the wisest Statesmen who ever existed would scarcely be able to parry their wild exertions, upon that well-known principle, that a man determined to throw away his own life is master of the life of the most exalted and most securely guarded of his fellow-creatures. That the French have acted on the system here laid down from almost the commencement of their Revolution, seems to me demonstrated by undeniable facts ; and I must call it a great error in Mr. Pitt, if he could ever believe in their professions of peace and œconomy (as some of his speeches give us room to suppose.) Their system never could be pacific to other nations after the open affronts put on all the Governments of Europe on the 19th of June 1790, by the admission of Anacharsis Cloot's* extravagant embassy, and the insulting manner in which their decree that abolished titles was worded ; as nobility and gentry, under any shape, were declared utterly incompatible with a free Constitution. An author that delighted, like Mr.

* See the Historical Essay, page 157, and Sequel,

Burke, in poetical decorations, might imagine the *Genius of Evil*, the Arimanius of the Persians, or the Moloch of the Canaanites, hovering over the Assembly, “grinning horribly a ghastly “smile,” and snuffing the scent of those streams of human blood predestined to flow in consequence of that fatal day. But there needs no poetry beyond the picture described by the Directory itself of the miseries of this present war (in the paper we have commented upon) when it is its will and pleasure to throw the blame upon England. With about as much justice might Cæsar throw the blame of all his dreadful slaughters upon the Gauls, who would not at his first bidding submit to the power of Rome.

From the above-mentioned period that party, now distinguished by the name of Jacobins, laid down their plan to rule France and all Europe by the means of clubs, and to abolish gentry every where by the discontents their agents were commissioned to excite. At that time they also went upon a principle worse, if possible, than the rest, and which they have since appeared to relinquish—that no Government was good, unless administered by a single legislative Assembly. Universal empire or total ruin, democracy or slavery, conquest or death,

were from that hour inscribed on the Jacobine political standards; and no nation will henceforth have strength to cope with this energy of despair, unless they assume a similar energy themselves. It may be repeated continually in books, speeches, and conversations, that neutrality would have ensured our safety: neutrality would have been taken as a sign of fear, and fear would sooner or later have invited the French to complete our ruin.

Let Englishmen consider impartially what other European powers have gained by their neutrality, and then reflect what grounds they have to believe that our neutrality would have insured us peace and happiness.

Venice did not refuse any sacrifice, however dishonourable, and crowned them all by ordering the unhappy titular King of France to quit her territories, although protected by the rank of Venetian Nobleman, anciently bestowed upon the representative of the House of Bourbon. All Europe recollects his spirited answer: "I am ready to depart, but first let me with my own hand strike out the name of Bourbon from your *golden book*." In less than two years, the French, unmoved by their humili-

ations, broke into the Venetian territory in pursuit of the Austrians; and having garrisoned the towns of Brescia and Bergamo, quickly encouraged the inhabitants to shake off the Venetian Government, and set up for themselves. Still the Austrians retreated farther and farther; the French garrisoned Verona; Buonaparte pursued the Arch-duke Charles into Carinthia; and the Venetians, reduced to despair, foreseeing that all their towns would be seduced like Brescia and Bergamo, took advantage of his absence, and persuaded the people of Verona to revolt against the French. But though I say the Venetians did this, I must add, that it remains uncertain whether that sudden revolt was the act of their Government, or of some individuals, for the French are in the habit of accusing, without bringing proofs to confirm their accusations. Supposing this sudden attack was against the law of nations, the first infringement of that law was the work of the French, when they seized the citadels of a neutral power, and protected its subjects in their insurrection. Yet for this act, at worst an act of retaliation, the Venetian Government was dissolved, their fleet united to the fleet of their invaders, their arsenal plundered, their merchants ruined by heavy contributions, all their old institutions trampled

in the dust, and their famous *golden book*, their register of nobility, scornfully committed to the flames, as if a kind of poetical retribution punished the insult they had offered to the House of Bourbon to appease the unappeaseable hatred of democracy. Nor was this all—not even the refuge of obscure independence is permitted them. The deplorable example of Poland is renewed, and Venice, divided between three rival powers, France, Austria, the Cisalpine Republic, has even lost her existence. The foreign gazettes, even some that used to profess devotion to the French interest, are full of lamentations, on her hard destiny—and the English Opposition is silent!—that Opposition which made the walls of St. Stephen's resound with invectives against the "*Crowned Robbers*" that divided Poland. Do they mean that robbery ceases to be a crime when two Republics have a share in the spoils, and are we to infer that their morality is solely guided by their political friendships? Was the Government of Venice so odious that it deserved no pity? It could not be so bad as that of Poland, since it allowed of no slaves, no vassals attached to the glebe. Although some of its particular institutions have lately been represented in an odious light, Republicans

should know that its * name was once used as the symbol of Republican Liberty ; and that English Republican Harrington, beneath whose authority Mr. Erskine was well pleased to shelter his worthy client Tom Paine, loudly preferred Venice to the limited Monarchy of England, and to almost all the Commonwealths of Antiquity.

But Venice is not the only neutral victim sacrificed to the restless spirit of Jacobinism. The Government of Genoa was not merely neutral in the contest, it was friendly to France, and supplied it with stores and provisions. Yet its Doge and Senate have been forced to give way to a new democracy, which Buonaparte models and re-models at his pleasure.

The Grisons lay sheltered behind their mountains, and took no part in the contest ; but through the influence of the Chiefs of the new Cisalpine Republic they have lost their Sove-

* The old French wit and *philosophe* Montagne, when he meant to confess that a friend of his was inclined to Republicanism, uses words to this effect : " To be sure he had rather have been born at Venice than in Poitou ; and he was " not much in the wrong for that opinion."

in the dust, and their famous *golden book*, their register of nobility, scornfully committed to the flames, as if a kind of poetical retribution punished the insult they had offered to the House of Bourbon to appease the unappeaseable hatred of democracy. Nor was this all—not even the refuge of obscure independence is permitted them. The deplorable example of Poland is renewed, and Venice, divided between three rival powers, France, Austria, the Cisalpine Republic, has even lost her existence. The foreign gazettes, even some that used to profess devotion to the French interest, are full of lamentations, on her hard destiny—and the English Opposition is silent!—that Opposition which made the walls of St. Stephen's resound with invectives against the “*Crowned Robbers*” that divided Poland. Do they mean that robbery ceases to be a crime when two Republics have a share in the spoils, and are we to infer that their morality is solely guided by their political friendships? Was the Government of Venice so odious that it deserved no pity? It could not be so bad as that of Poland, since it allowed of no slaves, no vassals attached to the glebe. Although some of its particular institutions have lately been represented in an odious light, Republicans

should know that its * name was once used as the symbol of Republican Liberty ; and that English Republican Harrington, beneath whose authority Mr. Erskine was well pleased to shelter his worthy client Tom Paine, loudly preferred Venice to the limited Monarchy of England, and to almost all the Commonwealths of Antiquity.

But Venice is not the only neutral victim sacrificed to the restless spirit of Jacobinism. The Government of Genoa was not merely neutral in the contest, it was friendly to France, and supplied it with stores and provisions. Yet its Doge and Senate have been forced to give way to a new democracy, which Buonaparte models and re-models at his pleasure.

The Grisons lay sheltered behind their mountains, and took no part in the contest ; but through the influence of the Chiefs of the new Cisalpine Republic they have lost their Sove-

* The old French wit and *philosophe* Montagne, when he meant to confess that a friend of his was inclined to Republicanism, uses words to this effect : “ To be sure he had rather have been born at Venice than in Poitou ; and he was “ not much in the wrong for that opinion.”

reignty over the Valteline. Perhaps the Grisons had abused it; but the point now in question is simply, whether the most strict neutrality has enabled any State to escape from the violence of France and her allies. Switzerland cannot fairly be said to have escaped. Geneva is almost ruined; the Aristocratic Cantons, those first objects of French intrigue in the early periods of the Revolution, are likely to become its latest victims, and the Jacobins are eagerly expecting the signal to disorganize the Canton of Berne. In the mean while the French demands rise every day upon the Swiss in the most insulting progression. Sometimes they are ordered to dismiss the English Minister, sometimes to break the laws of hospitality towards unfortunate emigrants, sometimes they must rescind the sentences of their own Courts of Justice, and latterly their veteran officers must lay aside the order of merit bestowed on them by former Kings of France; an order (as its name denotes) not confined to Aristocracy or the Catholic religion, but bestowed indiscriminately on long and meritorious services in the field.

It may be answered, that England was too powerful to receive such gross affronts as these.

But the power of a nation depends in great measure on its reputation of bravery; and all our neighbours must have believed us influenced by cowardly fear, if we had suffered Holland to be over-run without making one effort to prevent it. The Democrats may inquire, why did England protect the House of Nassau?—Let us answer, Why did the French endeavour to ruin the House of Nassau, that they might the sooner engage Holland in their conspiracy with Tippoo for ruining our settlements in the East-Indies? This fact * mentioned in the Historical Essay on the Conquests of France, is now confirmed beyond denial by the confession of that very man who was to have executed the project, the Marquis de Bouillé, who, in the year 1785, (only two years after France had made peace with England,) was offered the command of a united Dutch and French army, whose rendezvous was to be in the harbour of Trincomale, and who were to act in concert with our enemies in the Peninsula.

This fact cannot now be doubted; for it is not the interest of the Marquis de Bouillé, or

* See Hist. Essay, page 113, 114. See Bouillé's Memoirs, page 42, 43.

any other emigrant, to publish, much less to exaggerate, the treachery of the late Court of France. During the whole of the present reign, our King, in regard to all the neighbouring powers, has been "more sinned against than sinning." The measure of taxing America may have been blameable, but foreign powers had no right to interfere. Indeed it appears by a passage in Bertrand de Moleville's Memoirs, that the late King of France was at last sensible of his error in that particular. From other books it appears, that unhappy Prince was deceived by being told that the English intended to seize the French West-Indies as an amends for the loss of America. Frenchmen, both Democrats and Emigrants, may believe, if they please, a project so congenial to their own temper; but Englishmen know that such a measure was not likely to be adopted by their King, and was particularly repugnant to the softness and indecision of Lord North's character. From the period of the first treaty of Paris, England had not attempted to steal any colony of France, had taken no advantage of their internal disputes during the latter years of Louis the fifteenth's reign; no! nor did our Ministry form any connections with the Duke of Orleans prior to the French Revolution, as

the royalist author of the *Conjuration d'Orleans* would fain make his readers believe. The French will not find in English writers friendly to Administration (before the present war) such hostile denunciations against French commerce, as their writers (both popular and courtly) are filled with against ours. One of the very last books written by a Courtier before the abolition of Monarchy, the *Histoire de la Mer du Sud*, a work of La Borde, late Valet de Chambre to Louis the fifteenth, seems partly written to excite the Jealousy of the Spaniards against England: and to such a ridiculous height did that author carry his opinion of English cunning, as to believe (on the authority of I know not what magazine) that our nation had actually discovered the Northwest passage, and kept it secret for our own private ends.

The Royalists as French Courtiers, the Royalists for their own sakes did not deserve the assistance of England; it was the hostility of the Republicans which forced us into hostility, when our Government only wished for neutrality. Another little circumstance must again be quoted from Bouillé's *Memoirs**; the King of

* See page 434.

Sweden, when engaged in his romantic project of invading France, was glad to be certain of the neutrality of England, as if he had entertained some distant fears lest we should take the part of the new French Constitution. And Lord Grenville, in one of his letters to Lord Malmesbury, has solemnly denied that our Court had any concern whatever in the Convention of Pilnitz.

But the French Republicans were determined by Condorcet and Brissot's avowal to teach all nations how easy it was to throw off their Government; the French nation thought its honour particularly engaged to ruin the Stadtholder; whilst ours was engaged to support him, it thought its interests concerned in ruining our East-India trade; and there is no doubt that ours was concerned in saving it. I will confess that there was one moment in which the French Constituent Assembly shewed moderation by refusing to discuss the merits of a quarrel in the Eastern Seas between Commodore Cornwallis and some French Captains. But Mirabeau, who aspired to be First Minister, had written the most virulent declamations against our East-India Company, and justified Tippoo-Saib's cruelties; but during Lord Cornwallis' war with

Tippoo, the French Journalists had expressed the liveliest satisfaction whenever we met with a repulse, and expressly said, that "it was a mistake to think the English power in India too secure to be shaken." Brissot, the leading Member, when the present war broke out, shewed an equal hatred to our commerce in general, and to our East-India commerce in particular. Kerfaint, the sea-officer, even went beyond Brissot in some of his violent speeches.

* The applause of Brissot's as well as of Rober-spierre's Party ushered into the Convention a Dutchman who reviled the Stadtholder and the existing Government of his Country; the bolt was lifted up against Holland, and ready to be hurled whenever the news reached them that England and Ireland were engaged in those civil commotions which Condorçet and all their journalists predicted. Why should they predict commotions if their Ambassador Chauvelin, or their friends in the clubs, had not given them hopes of such events? A hundred little circumstances strengthen the probability that we should have been involved in civil, if we had escaped foreign, war. It is not too insignificant to mention the words *ça ira* so repeatedly scrib-

* See Hist. Essay, pages 262, 263.

bled on our walls, or the attempts to burn the Duke of Brunfwick's effigy on Kennington Common, since the most Democratic writers in France described many similar contrivances as used more particularly by the Duke of Orleans. They have invented a new phrase for such arts ; they call them "The Tactics of Insurrection," and observe that the Parisians have lost much of their skill in these tactics since the total ruin of the Orleans Party.

But suppose we could have remained peaceable for a few years, both at home and abroad, France would long before this time have atchieved the conquests in Italy, Germany, Flanders, have made itself masters of Holland, and would now be preparing with its European slaves on one side, and America on the other, joined * in league against our commerce to expel us from both East and West Indies, and to invade us if we offered to resist. Individuals, galled with the new taxes, may cry out, We should have had more money to repel our enemy. True ; but our enemy would have had a more numerous fleet to give probability to

* See Hamilton's Observations on the Dispute between the United States and France.

his threats of invasion, and a better opportunity to attack our colonies. Had we, indeed, increased in commerce and wealth as rapidly as some declaimers have imagined, the French, whose merchants have been impoverished by Roberfpierre's tyranny, the French who have adopted a system of Government less favourable than ours to commerce, because it does not trust power into the hands of property, the French would equally have longed for the pillage of Bristol or of London. Our exclusive trade is the great object of their invectives, and to judge by the nature of human passions, and especially by the violent passions of Frenchmen, would equally have been so, though we had never made any effort to overturn their Government.

An observation may now be made that will open a new field of discussion. If our colonies and commerce are such objects of abhorrence, it is not prudent to increase the jealousy of Europe by retaining our acquisitions. I should agree to this remark, if the increase of our foreign settlements was our sole object. Few branches of trade are worth the money that may be spent to acquire them by a war; but the possessions demanded from Holland are (either one or both

of them) necessary to secure what we already possess.

The general opinion amongst well-informed persons is, that Ceylon is more necessary to us than the Cape, and that the harbour of Trincomale is the circumstance which gives it the preference. It has been said this Winter in the House of Commons, that none of our conquests deserved a war to retain them; that Trincomale would require two millions to make it useful; that we prospered in the East Indies before we had Trincomale, and may prosper again. These are likely arguments to take with those who can think of nothing but the taxes; but nevertheless the plain matter of fact ought to be laid before the Public.

It has always been a most serious consideration to those conversant in East-Indian affairs, that there exists no harbour for English men of war during the stormy season or monsoon in the whole circuit of the peninsula from Bombay to the Ganges. The French, who could retire during that critical season to the Isles de France and Bourbon, had even in former wars some advantage over us, and were often beforehand with our fleets on the coast of Coromandel. The

nation who had a fleet stationed at the Cape of Good Hope would be nearer to an equality with the French during an Indian war; but the principal advantages would probably be annexed to the possession of Ceylon. A slight inspection of the map will shew that Ceylon, lying at the very point of the peninsula, is equally calculated to command both the Malabar and Coromandel seas; and the harbour of Trincomale is of such superior excellence, that a fleet may be sheltered within it from the utmost violence of the stormy season; and consequently a hostile fleet may invade our possessions on the Coromandel coast at the very first change of the monsoon, and before our men of war could be ready to give any assistance.

It is certainly true that we prospered formerly without Trincomale; but we never fought against the Dutch and French united in the East-Indies before the last war. The first step taken by our commanders was to seize Trincomale; and it is pretty generally supposed that our Ministers meant to have insisted strenuously on retaining it by the treaty of peace. Unfortunately, during the negotiation, news arrived of the re-capture of Trincomale; the French fleet was then on the coast assisting the

army of Tippoo; and many well-informed persons think that the signature of the treaty of Paris saved our Indian affairs from total ruin. Vergennes was at that moment induced to suspend his projects for the ruin of England to give time for repairing the French finances. But he was probably mortified at the opportunity he had lost; and therefore two years after he entered upon that treacherous project of attack, suspected at the time, and now fully brought to light. The harbour of Trincomale was the spot recommended by Mirabeau (in his book upon the Scheldt), and expressly mentioned in Bouillé's Memoirs, as the intended place of rendezvous, where the French and Dutch fleets and armies were to have watched the opportunity of giving assistance to the country powers. If England were to spend two millions in rendering Trincomale secure from attack, it would, indeed, be an immense sum; but (supposing it necessary for that purpose,) if it secured all the stockholders of the East-India Company from ruin, it would not be lavishly expended.

Let us not deceive ourselves with vain hopes of peace and tranquillity derived from tame submission, but take an enlarged view of the probable consequences of such a treaty as our enemies

seem to expect. Let us hear what kind of a peace Dumourier thinks we shall be forced into; and as he was well acquainted with the schemes of the Jacobins before the beginning of the war, he is likely to give a true guess at their present ones. * “ She (i. e. France) will retake Corsica and her Western Colonies, or force them to be restored at the peace, augmented by the half of St. Domingo; *She will cause Gibraltar and Jamaica to be restored to Spain*; she will cause to be restored to the Dutch all that the English have taken; she will shake their empire in the East by arming against them the Indian powers, who bend at present under their iron yoke.”

Is there a Briton whose indignation does not rise within him, at the bare mention of such conditions of peace? But suppose Gibraltar and Jamaica were preserved, even to restore all our conquests, uncompelled by greater misfortunes than we have yet experienced, would be to teach the French the *exact limits of our courage and our patriotism*, and shew them there is no affront we will not brook rather than endure the transitory pressure of taxes, or stand the threats of inva-

* Dumourier, Etat présent du Royaume de Portugal. Avis au Lecteur, page 17.

sion, even whilst our naval force is yet unbroken.

As the Republican Governors of France have so exactly copied all the ambitious and treacherous projects of their Court, can we believe they will not take Dumourier's hint, and copy the project against India detailed in Bouillé's Memoirs ?

We now learn from *official authority*, that not to have conquered Flanders was one of the faults of their late Monarchy ; they need only publish another Manifesto, and charge it as another fault on their Kings not to have pulled down that monstrous fabric of tyranny which England has (according to their creed) erected in the East-Indies.

That some enormities have been committed by Englishmen, it were hard to deny ; but those enormities were greatly aggravated by party rage,* and the regulations now introduced into our Indian possessions will make their repetition almost impossible. It is not too bold to assert, that if we are allowed to go on for thirty

* Amongst other books on this subject, see Law on the Rising Resources of Bengal.

years on our present system, the English territories in Hindostan will become the happiest territories in Asia. But the more flourishing the country, and the richer our Hindoo subjects, the more will those riches be envied by the rapacity of the native Princes. French emissaries will haunt their Courts, and stir up discontent; leagues will be made similar to the former French alliance with Tippoo; Republicans will be armed to avenge the wrongs of despots; the Dutch will headlong be dragged into the quarrel; for alas! since the barrier of Flanders is broken down, it is out of their power to refuse the commands of France. Their fleets and armies will rendezvous with the French; and that scheme of destruction planned in 1785, but delayed by our protection of the Stadtholder in 1787, will, perhaps, be executed before the close of the present century.

And will the cause of humanity be served when independence is restored to the Indian Princes? I would recommend the consideration of the fate of Persia to those who are perpetually exclaiming that Europeans have impoverished Hindostan: they will see a flourishing country reduced to desolation by the fall of its antient Princes, without the least interfer-

ence of European ambition. The fall of the Mogul empire was the principal cause of the miseries of India; and if the British were expelled, it is but too likely, considering the inveterate hatred between the Mahometans and Gentoos, that Hindostan would be reduced to the miserable situation of Persia, whose trade, once an object of rivalry amongst nations, is now utterly annihilated. Thus in the end, French and Dutchmen would suffer, as well as English, from this Revolution so eagerly anticipated by French authors; but in the mean while the envy of the Jacobin sect would be gratified, the wealthy would be ruined, and that were happiness enough!

But the loss of our East-Indian trade is not the greatest danger to be apprehended. The French are already threatening America with war if they will not repeal the commercial treaty lately concluded with England. The Spaniards are jealous of our fishery in the Southern ocean: ergo, it must be yielded up if France commands it. The West-Indian Islands must be abandoned to the tyranny of savage Negroes and Mulattoes; in short, we must yield up, one by one, every source of our commercial wealth; nor will the French cease persecuting such par-

simonious and fearful spirits, as we shall then have shewn ourselves, whilst we have a single foreign settlement left, or a single law existing to protect our commerce.

In the Historical Essay on the Conquests of France,* an opinion is delivered that the French in the latter end of 1792, expected not solely the abolition of Monarchy in England, but the total alteration of our commercial laws, and some passages from Brissot's works are alluded to. This opinion has received an unexpected confirmation from a pamphlet written in America by Robert Harper under the name of Observations on the Dispute between the United States and France. † Amongst various instructions given to Genet, the French Minister sent to America, the Executive Council (then mostly composed of Girondins) hint that a treaty with America “ admits a latitude still more extensive, “ in becoming a national agreement, in which “ two great nations shall establish a mutual understanding to befriend the empire of liberty “ whenever it can be embraced, to guarantee “ the Sovereignty of the people, and to punish

* See page 282 of that work.

† See pages 45, 46, and 140.

“ those powers who still keep up an exclusive
 “ colonial and commercial system, by declaring
 “ that their vessels shall not be received in the
 “ ports of the contracting parties.”

These instructions were dated, some January the 3d, and others January the 17th, 1793, and the latest date was seven days prior to this dismissal of Chauvelin, on which insult (as they call it) to the French Republic our Opposition delight to lay the blame of the war. Here were the seeds of war scattered plentifully, if no other hand had sown them; for it would not have been imagined five years ago, however our national spirit may be lowered at present, that we could avoid an open rupture with two powers who should agree to exclude us from their ports unless we repealed the act of navigation.

But let us suppose that all acts are repealed which tend to favour the commerce and navigation of our countrymen in preference to foreigners: shall we be suffered to shrink quietly within the limits of our Island and settle our own internal affairs unmolested? It is probable, on the contrary, that the French Ambassador's house will be the receptacle of all malecontents, Scotch, Irish, or English, and Minis-

ters will be made or unmade, at the pleasure neither of a British King or British Parliament, but of a French Directory. We all must remember the cry excited some years ago against an imaginary *back-stairs influence*; but what will Englishmen feel when the back-stairs of a French Ambassador is considered as the road to distinction and preferment?

The aversion conceived in France against Marie-Antoinette, because it was imagined that under her protection the Austrian Minister interfered in the French Government, is a sufficient proof of the horror with which a great nation considers all foreign interference. The French are now practising in other Courts that base influence which they abhorred in their own, as is evident from the example of Spain, where they support the *favourite of female weakness* against the indignation both of nobles and of people, and boast without shame in all their journals, that French interest triumphs at Madrid through the medium of the Prince of peace, and M. de Cabarrus. After all their declarations against crowned ruffians who traffic in the blood of their subjects, they bind down the humbled Kings of Sardinia and Spain to send their subjects to be butchered in wars that

can only tend to involve their kingdoms in distress.

If we refuse to pay the tenth of our income to support our own Government, we may be forced next summer to pay it in contributions to Buonaparte, or, at best, be obliged some years hence to give it our new allies the French Directory to support them in some new project of ambition. Even at this very moment the papers inform us that circular letters have been written from the Hague to levy from the inhabitants the contribution of eight per cent. on all their income, and whoever does not pay his quota, an execution is immediately to be issued. The French may say, this is necessary to protect Holland against our ambition ; but all reflecting Dutchmen know our ambition would not have hurt them if they had not made themselves a province to France. Let their fate be a warning to England ; let not Englishmen suffer French agents to levy subsidies, and to direct our fleet (if yet we are allowed to keep one.) Nor is this all, our very Courts of Justice may be contaminated, and our Juries be compelled to acquit or condemn according as the culprit's principles please or displease the French Ambassador.

It is one great aim of the present Directory of France wherever their power extends to restrain the liberty of the press. For as the means by which they attained their present situation, and the means by which they defended it against the representatives of the people, are irreconcilable both to the principles of Monarchy and of Republicanism, they dread lest their conduct should be freely canvassed in any part of Europe. Many examples might be brought to prove this assertion, but two strong ones may suffice.

The Count D'Antraigues, accused of carrying on the supposed correspondence between Pichegru and the Emigrant Princes, has boldly asserted, that all the papers produced by the Directory, and sanctioned by Buonaparte, are rank forgeries, and was preparing to print a memoir on the subject, but, as the foreign papers assert, was prevented by the Emperor's orders, to shew his Majesty's sincere intention of taking no farther concern in the affairs of France. The Emperor may have the power to give such an order at Vienna, but how would the English like that their King should issue such an order in London? Richer-Serisy, a journalist who had shewed an inveterate hatred against the Directory, has been

lately arrested at Basle, and given up to the French Minister by order of that Government, and he will be immediately transported, without a trial, to Cayenne, (if some *lucky illness* does not take him off by the way.) Louis the XIVth, in the zenith of his pride and power, did not dare to insist on the Swiss Cantons giving up the unhappy Protestant refugees; and I know not why an independant state should bear affronts from a Republic sooner than from a Monarchy. If we are as timorous as the modern Swiss, we may expect the same disgraceful treatment; we may be commanded in a few years to surrender all French criminals (real or imaginary) and we may be reduced—I blush even at writing it—to act the part of bailiffs and constables to the French Directory. Or perhaps we may be ordered to erect a chapel for the Theo-philanthropists—alias Deïsts—or release French travellers in England from observing our laws relating to the Sabbath, or correct a preacher who shall dare in his sermons to mention Deïsm with severity. Does all this enumeration appear extravagant and impossible? Alas! it would have been held *as* impossible thirty years ago, that a treaty of peace would be popular which gave up Holland and Flanders to France, or that opposition would have dared to censure

Ministers for their unwillingness to give up at once all our conquests, when we had not lost a single colony, and scarce a single ship of the line. But it is no less true in national than in female honour : whoever has made one false step, is sure to be compelled to a second.

There is no insult to which our commerce, our Constitution, our religion, our very independence, will not be liable, if, on the present emergency, the different ranks and classes of society do not lay aside all groundless jealousies, and stand firmly by one another, and by their endangered country.

I have argued chiefly on the dangers of commerce, not that I hold it dearer than our Constitution and our religion, but that it seems to me that there was not pains enough taken at the beginning to convince the mercantile and manufacturing classes, that the French were as hostile to English merchants as to English Lords or Bishops. At last, however, the Directory (I thank them for it !) have written their malice so plainly *that he who runs may read it*, and have published a better apology for Mr. Pitt's severest measures than he, with all his oratory, ever made for himself.

There is no doubt that the measure of trebling the assessed taxes will press hard upon many tradesmen and mechanics; but before they thwart the measures of Government by ill-judged Opposition, let them consider what is the point at which they would make a stand, what is the mischief to our trade, or the affront to our independence, which they had rather pay a treble subsidy than endure; and next consider whether the best chance of escaping those mischiefs is not, and ever will be, to shew ourselves ready to meet the danger whilst it is yet at a distance.

Let them take the Redacteur into their hands, and read it carefully either by themselves or in their evening societies, and they may soon be convinced that France, if not resisted in time, will never be satisfied till she has given England *such* a Ministry and *such* a national representation, as will take care never to found a new colony, never to open a new branch of commerce, never to keep a fleet large enough to protect our merchantmen, never again to make an advantageous commercial treaty,—nor even to defend the possessions we now hold, or maintain the treaties that are yet in existence.

It would not be amiss if to this study they were to join Major Dirom's pamphlet on the defence of Great Britain, and observe the note to the eleventh page, where he relates the account he has heard of General Hoche's instructions to General Taitt, who commanded the expedition to Wales.

They were (in short) to set every where the poor against the rich, and to destroy all manufactories, collieries, and shipping, that the poor might find no means of subsistence but by entering into the French army. If Taitt's account of his own instructions can be credited, we may well exclaim with Major Dirom, what nation of barbarians ever made war in so shocking a manner!

You have often been told, my good countrymen, that your Government was oppressive, and your Parliament venal, and the French are such *good-natured friends*, as to repeat this obliging information. But mark how in the very same breath they revile these supposed oppressors for having secured to Britain the exclusive commerce of the world, and ask yourselves what greater benefits tradesmen and manufac-

turers could expect from the most limited Chief-Magistrate and the most uninfluenced representation.

Do not suppose that you will induce the French to peace by removing Mr. Pitt, and placing Mr. Fox in his room. If Mr. Fox was to make a stand against any exorbitant pretensions of the Directory, their revenge against him would be even keener than against Mr. Pitt, for it would be grounded on disappointment. They have certainly imagined (though I believe wrongfully), that the Parliamentary leaders of Opposition were capable (to gain their ends) of debasing the honour and dignity of this nation at the feet of France. If they should find themselves deceived, another clamour would be raised by their agents, and we should be driven from faction to faction, till none but affiliated Jacobins ruled this devoted country. Pretences could never be wanting. It would but cost the French Directory a few more bold assertions that the gold of Fox, instead of the gold of Pitt, was preparing a counter-revolution, and the imprisonment of a few more obnoxious persons, who would be condemned unheard on the evidence of papers that were never examined by any Court of Justice.

When the Government of England is in the hands of venal tools of France, when our sources of wealth are dried up or turned aside into the channel of Parisian luxury, then our shopkeepers and manufacturers may indeed become too poor to pay the current taxes, and will have reason to lament, too late, that they did not submit to an extraordinary tax, when that submission might have secured their trade to future times.

It has often been said by discontented philosophical writers: Oh! that our fore-fathers would but have endured the burden of their own wars and subsidies, and not loaded their posterity for ever with taxes to pay the interest due on the public funds!—Behold! an attempt is made to raise the subsidies within two years, and the very same philosophical mal-contents fall furiously on the Minister, and seem to inherit the sentiments of that man who exclaimed, “Why should I take care for posterity; I would fain know when posterity will take any care for me.”

But it is not our posterity that would feel the bad effects of a sudden and great depression of the funds. There are few tradesmen of any

note that have not some hoard of money entrusted to Government security, for their recourse upon sudden emergencies. They may have even now a daughter to portion, a son to settle in business; they may be obliged to sell out; and they already experience sufficient difficulties from the low state of the funds: for it is impossible to deny the evils occasioned by the war; my only aim is to prove that they are less chargeable on the Ministry than on the arrogance and ambition of France.

That evil which we all lament, that depression of the funds, would be augmented to so great a degree, if clamour or evasions cause this tax to fail, or be unproductive, that the honest tradesman who has entrusted his all to national faith would have too much reason to apply the good old homely proverb of *penny-wise and pound foolish*.

Another clamour has been raised, that the rich could not pay this tax and spend as much money as before upon tradesmen. Let me desire those men who use this argument to consider well to what a length it extends, and that it obliges them to discourage their families from reading those books, and their clerks or appren-

tices from frequenting those lectures, which tend to inflame the poor and middling classes against the rich, and which represent *their* need-
less luxury and expence as the cause of all the misery of the world.

Some evils, no doubt, it does occasion, and some retrenchments the present times demand, which will not much injure commerce; but if once such writers as Thelwall and Godwin could bring young minds to credit their paradoxes, both poor and rich might suffer, and starve together.

But it is now time that the richer and higher ranks of society should hear the voice of advice in their turn, to call forth all the virtuous emotions of their hearts. They are English gentlemen, they ought to be acquainted with English history, and remember that the terrors of a Spanish Armada did not induce Elizabeth to beg pardon of the King of Spain, and dismiss her Ministers.

They have had a classical education, and ought to be acquainted with those records of human ambition, human greatness, and human misery, preserved by the classical authors. They

should not think it strange to be reminded of those base arts by which the Romans undermined the liberties of Europe, and Philip of Macedon had previously undermined the liberties of Greece; and they ought not to forget that the corruption (in every free state) of factious orators and demagogues was equally familiar to the Monarch and to the Republic. They should not be surprized to read allusions to the situation of Demosthenes, who was accused of having begun and having persisted in that war with Philip which ended so fatally in the battle of Cheronea. Yet the Athenians, capricious and ungrateful as they often were, did not judge of Demosthenes from the event of his councils, but from the motives that inspired him, and from the advantages that would have attended on success.

It is not an uncurious speculation at the present moment that it should have been recorded in a late life* of Lord Mansfield, how that venerable Magistrate particularly delighted in the oration Demosthenes pronounced to vindicate his conduct against Eschines; and how he ad-

* See Holiday's Life of Lord Mansfield, with his Quotation from Lord Monboddo, page 5 to page 10.

mired even that bold paradox, “ Could the
 “ Athenians have foretold the misfortunes of
 “ the present war, their honour and the honour
 “ of their ancestors would still have urged them
 “ to undertake it.” * I will not give way to the
 romantic heroism of a Grecian orator in my de-
 fence of Mr. Pitt ; it must be still his best ex-
 cuse, that no mortal could have foreseen most
 of the present events. But if Fox, Grey, and
 Sheridan, think fit to impeach Mr. Pitt as the
 author of the present war, he may, with alter-
 ing two names of battles, apply to himself that
 famous oath of Demosthenes, held forth by an-
 tient writers as the model of sublimity. “ No !
 “ fellow-citizens, I did not err :—I swear it by
 “ those heroes who fell at Blenheim and at
 “ Ramillies.”

But all the sublime eloquence of Demost-
 henes could not save the Athenians, a people
 immersed in luxury, more prone to ramble about
 every place of public resort, and decide on the
 merit of actors, dancers, and musicians, than to
 sacrifice their time and their money to the ser-
 vice of the State. Let the gentlemen of Eng-

* See Francis' Translation of Demosthenes, Vol. II.
 from page 451 to 456.

land prove to the world that as their character is more noble, so they deserve, and may expect, a better fate.

I am not ashamed to own my opinion that Aristocracy ought to be the principal ingredient amidst the powers of a well-regulated State. But not a Gothic and feudal Aristocracy : I mean an Aristocracy where power is chiefly lodged in the hands of property, where commercial property is respected,—but not preferred before landed property, and where, amongst landed proprietors, they whose families have been longest (as it were) rooted into the very soil of their country, are *cæteris paribus*, held most worthy to obtain the rank of legislators.

It depends on the Members of this natural Aristocracy to prove the justice of their cause, or to cover their advocates with blank confusion. Such is the constitution of all civilized society, that the first rudiments of education received from our parents most frequently determine our lot through life, and some, even from their birth, will be destined to work, and others to think.

But if those whose business it is to reflect,

will employ their thoughts only on sensual pleasures or frivolous amusements, they must not be surprized if those whose business it is to work, will suppose that the world would be improved if they were to compel their superiors to labour, and take the trouble of thinking in their turn.

The Democrats are mistaken,—such a sudden unhinging of society will no more improve the condition of mankind, than the sudden shifting of the poles of the earth would improve the seasons.

But it belongs to the gentry of England to convince them mildly of their error by the example of their virtues. In supporting the national Constitution, and the national honour, they consult their own safety. If they should set the example of murmuring at the hundreds or tens of hundreds that their country may demand of them, if they peevishly drive our Government into a hasty and shameful peace, they may live to hear French agents propose in a National Convention that all who ever bore distinctions of Heraldry shall be excluded from office, whilst some madder enthusiast than the rest winds

up the debate with a vote of general transportation.

Let them remember that if power is annexed to property, it must be on the tacit condition that men of property should contribute the largest share towards the necessities of the State.

In two ways the gentlemen of England may shew a generosity that will deserve perpetual honour. The first was proposed by Mr. Addington,—a voluntary contribution beyond the sum imposed by law. But perhaps another kind of liberality might be more useful by obviating the murmurs of men in low circumstances.

Every rich man within his own circle contributing to pay the taxes of his poorer neighbours and dependants, and thus convincing malcontents that the upper ranks of society are the friends and guardians of the poor, not tyrants and oppressors, as Jacobins falsely pretend.

But if men's circumstances do not enable them to be thus generous, there is one mark of patriotic fortitude which every one may give, by steadily resolving not to do any act which might shake public or private credit upon the rumour

of invasion. The hasty manner in which the inhabitants of the North drew their money from the Newcastle Banks when the French fleet was off Ireland, contributed greatly to the stoppage of the national Bank, and did their country as much harm as if an army had been defeated.

But this is not all ; the exigencies of the times demand a spirit of serious reflection, which has been too long a stranger to fashionable circles. The severity of the times must oblige even the wealthiest to diminish their expences ; let them resolutely cut off such pleasures as are least conducive to public benefit. Let the Opera be deserted for a winter ; let the luxury of splendid dinners and suppers be retrenched ; let all gaming-glubs be forsaken ; let the education of children be conducted in a less expensive and less frivolous stile. Teach them religion and history in preference to music and a theatrical stile of dancing ; and keep them for a longer period out of the vortex of dissipation.

If these precepts sound too harshly, talk no longer of liberty and the rights of mankind :— Whatever side a man belongs to, Government

or Opposition, he is ripe for slavery, when he loses the power of self-command. All our allies have deserted us,—it is true,—but let us in this emergency resort to some old friends whom we have too long neglected ; let us endeavour to form an alliance with the virtues, a firm and lasting alliance with religion, temperance, economy, and public decorum.

December 26th, 1797.

FINIS.



BOOKS printed for J. DEBRETT.

AN HISTORICAL ESSAY on the AMBITION and CONQUESTS of FRANCE, with some REMARKS on the FRENCH REVOLUTION. Containing,

- 1.—Sketch of General History previous to the French Revolution;
- 2.—Remarks on the French Revolution from 1789 to 1791;
- 3.—Abridgment of the History of the Revolution from 1791 to 1796.

—————Soldier, I had arms—
Had wealth, dominion. Dost thou wonder, Roman,
I fought to save them? What if Cæsar aims
To lord it universal o'er the world,
Shall the world tamely crouch at Cæsar's foot-stool?

CARACTACUS.

In one Volume, 6s. in boards.

MEMOIRES sur la VIE et le CARACTERE de MADAME la DUCHESSE de POLIGNAC—Avec des Anecdotes intéressantes sur la Revolution Française, & sur la Personne de MARIE ANTOINETTE, Reine de France. Ecrites par la Comtesse Diane de Polignac. 2s. 6d.

“This little work might be put with advantage into the hands of young ladies who are learning the French language. The interest their sensible hearts must take in the narrative, would animate and alleviate the trouble of overcoming the difficulties of the lesson; and they would contemplate more than one or two of the most noble models or examples of female excellence.”

English Rev. Jan. 1796.

A COLLECTION of STATE PAPERS relative to the WAR against FRANCE, now carrying on by GREAT BRITAIN and the several other EUROPEAN POWERS. Containing authentic COPIES of TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, PROCLAMATIONS, MANIFESTOES, DECLARATIONS, MEMORIALS, REMONSTRANCES, OFFICIAL LETTERS, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, LONDON GAZETTE ACCOUNTS of the WAR, &c. &c. &c.—many of which have never before been published in England. Printed uniformly to bind with the Parliamentary Debates. In 6 Volumes. 2l. 6s. 6d. boards.

OBSERVATIONS on Mr. GRATTAN'S ADDRESS to the CITIZENS of DUBLIN. by C. F. SHERIDAN, Esq.; Fourth Edition, 1s. 6d.

THOUGHTS on the Defence of Property, by UVEDALE PRICE, Esq. 1s.

BOOKS printed for J. DEBRETT.

General WASHINGTON's LETTER to the People of America on his Resignation of the Office of President of the United States. Third Edition. 1s.

"They who admire the noble effusions of freedom, tempered with a wise and virtuous moderation, will experience a pleasure in perusing this new testimony of the worth and talents of General Washington, which we are not inclined to anticipate by any extract."—Crit. Rev. Jan. 1797.

The CORRESPONDENCE between a TRAVELLER and a MINISTER of STATE, in October and November 1792; preceded by Remarks upon the Origin and the final Objects of the present War, as well as upon the political Position of Europe in October 1796. Translated from the Original, and accompanied with a Preface, by N. W. WRAXALL, Esq. with a joint Address to Messrs. PITT and C. J. Fox. 2s. 6d.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, of the PRESENT SESSION, to the ADJOURNMENT.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; or the HISTORY of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of LORDS and COMMONS—Containing an ACCOUNT of the most interesting SPEECHES and MOTIONS, authentic COPIES of all important LETTERS, PAPERS, and PROTESTS, laid before either House during the present Session; taken from Manuscript Notes and other authentic Papers—with the assistance and concurrence of many persons of the first character and distinction; and will be regularly continued, weekly, during the present Session. Volume 1.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, of the LAST SESSION.
3 vols. 1l. 15s.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, from 1780 to 1784—in
14 vols. 5l. 12s.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, from 1784 to 1790—in
13 vols. 6l. 18s.

PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER, from 1790 to 1796; 18
vols. 9l. 5s.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, 1743 to 1774: 7 vols.
2l. 12s. 6d.

e-
ed

ed
re
e-
ny

a
ed
nt
er
e-
s.

S-

he
M-
ng
er
er
tes
ce
be
I.

N.

-in

-in

18

ols.